¿Para qué sirven las reglas fiscales? Un análisis crítico de la experiencia argentina
In: Revista CEPAL, Band 2007, Heft 91, S. 53-65
ISSN: 1682-0908
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In: Revista CEPAL, Band 2007, Heft 91, S. 53-65
ISSN: 1682-0908
In: CEPAL review, Heft 91, S. 53-66
ISSN: 0251-2920
World Affairs Online
In: Economia: journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 185-191
ISSN: 1533-6239
In: http://hdl.handle.net/10908/411
Fil: Braun, Miguel. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. ; Fil: Tommasi, Mariano. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
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In: Economics & politics, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 1468-0343
We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro‐cyclical.
In: Economics & politics, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 77-100
ISSN: 0954-1985
Latin America is a volatile, crisis-prone region, with limited and inadequate social insurance. Therefore, the long-term as well as the recent poor suffer significantly during crises. Furthermore, social spending is procyclical in the region, but less so than total spending, indicating that the effectiveness of compensatory social policies designed to protect those vulnerable to crises is constrained by adjustments during recessions. The causes of procyclical fiscal policy lie in the political constraints on saving during expansions, combined with limited creditworthiness during recessions, and enhanced by economic volatility and a low share of automatic stabilizers in the budget. We evaluate policy options to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy, such as stabilization funds, fiscal rules and reform of budget institutions, and argue in favor of integrated policy proposals based on more country-specific analysis, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil.
BASE
Latin America is a volatile, crisis-prone region, with limited and inadequate social insurance. Therefore, the long-term as well as the recent poor suffer significantly during crises. Furthermore, social spending is procyclical in the region, but less so than total spending, indicating that the effectiveness of compensatory social policies designed to protect those vulnerable to crises is constrained by adjustments during recessions. The causes of procyclical fiscal policy lie in the political constraints on saving during expansions, combined with limited creditworthiness during recessions, and enhanced by economic volatility and a low share of automatic stabilizers in the budget. We evaluate policy options to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy, such as stabilization funds, fiscal rules and reform of budget institutions, and argue in favor of integrated policy proposals based on more country-specific analysis, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil. ; Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
BASE
Latin America is a volatile, crisis-prone region, with limited and inadequate social insurance. Therefore, the long-term as well as the recent poor suffer significantly during crises. Furthermore, social spending is procyclical in the region, but less so than total spending, indicating that the effectiveness of compensatory social policies designed to protect those vulnerable to crises is constrained by adjustments during recessions. The causes of procyclical fiscal policy lie in the political constraints on saving during expansions, combined with limited creditworthiness during recessions, and enhanced by economic volatility and a low share of automatic stabilizers in the budget. We evaluate policy options to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy, such as stabilization funds, fiscal rules and reform of budget institutions, and argue in favor of integrated policy proposals based on more country-specific analysis, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil. ; Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
BASE